We argue that the 2005 bankruptcy abuse reform (BAR) contributed to the surge in subprime foreclosures that followed its passage. Before BAR, over-indebted mortgagors could free up income to pay the mortgage by filing bankruptcy and having their unsecured debts discharged. BAR blocks that maneuver for better-off filers by way of a means test. We identify the effects of BAR using state home equity bankruptcy exemptions; filers in low-exemption states were not very protected before BAR, so they would be less affected by the reform. Difference-in-difference regressions confirm four predictions implied by that identification strategy. Our findings add to research trying to explain the surge in subprime foreclosures and to a broader literature on household bankruptcy demand and credit supply.
1 Not by coincidence, we argue, did subprime foreclosures surge (and home prices peak) right after BAR took effect in October of 2005 (Chart 1). We see BAR as a small, exogenous, financial shock that caused seismic effects far from the epicenter.
Our specific argument is that BAR contributed to the surge in subprime foreclosures by shifting risk from unsecured credit card lenders to secured mortgage lenders. Before BAR, any household could file Ch. 7 bankruptcy and have credit cards and other unsecured debts discharged. Sidestepping unsecured debts left more income to pay the mortgage. BAR blocked that maneuver by way of a means test that forces better-off households who demand bankruptcy to file Ch. 13, where they must continue paying unsecured lenders. When the means test binds, cash constrained mortgagors who might have saved their home by filing Ch. 7 are more likely to face foreclosure or to have to sell their home.
Although we lack data to identify when individual filers are bound by the means test, we show a priori that the means test is more binding (all else equal) in states with higher home equity bankruptcy exemptions.
2 Bankruptcy exemptions are the opposite of collateral; they determine how much home equity Ch. 7 filers get to keep from unsecured creditors. We reason 1 We prefer BAR over BAPCPA because it is pronounceable, and because abuse prevention clearly came first (White 2006) . Congress hardened the law in sympathy with consumer lenders, particularly credit card lenders, alleging that some filers were abusing bankruptcy to avoid debts they actually within their (filers') means (Skeel 2001, Nunez and Rosenthal 2006) 2 White and Zhu (2008) find that a substantial fraction of filers in Delaware in 2006 were bound by the means test. Of 586 households that filed Ch.13, 22% did not pass the means test, and 89% owed unsecured debt. Among the 90 that home owners in states with low home equity exemption are less likely to demand Ch. 7, so the means test is less likely to affect outcomes in those states. In textbook terms, we identify BAR as a contraction in the -supply‖ of bankruptcy protection, and we predict a larger impact on foreclosures in states with high exemptions and hence, high -demand‖ for Ch. 7.
We buttress the identification by looking for differential effects of BAR across different classes of household credit. We expect BAR will reduce delinquency rates on unsecured loans in states with high exemptions because lenders in those states were most exposed to loss under bankruptcy before BAR. 3 We figure BAR will be unrelated to prime mortgage foreclosures because prime mortgagors are, by definition, unlikely to demand bankruptcy, regardless of exemptions.
We test those predictions using difference-in-difference regressions of mortgage foreclosure and loan delinquency rates estimated with state level, quarterly data over 1998:Q1 to 2007:Q3. The results are largely consistent with our predictions. Given home price appreciation and economic conditions, we find that the increase in subprime foreclosures after BAR was significantly higher in states with higher exemption. Prime foreclosure rates, by contrast, were unrelated to BAR. In still starker contrast, delinquency rates on unsecured personal loans decreased more post-BAR in states with higher home equity exemptions.
The estimated impact of BAR on subprime foreclosures is substantial. For a state with average home equity exemption, the average subprime foreclosure rate over the seven quarters after BAR was 12.6 percent higher than the average subprime foreclosure rate over all states over percent of Ch. 13 filers that actually filed payment plans, 38% committed to repay unsecured debts. The latter represent payments that were potentially avoidable under Ch. 7 before BAR. 3 We know from other evidence that those exemptions do affect bankruptcy demand. Ashcraft et al. (2007) find that the rush to file Ch. 7 just before the bankruptcy reform (Chart 2) was highest among states with riskier borrowers and high exemptions. Risky households demanded Ch. 7 while supply was high, and they demanded it most where Ch. 7 is most protective of equity owners. 
II. How BAR Might Have Increased Foreclosures
Bankruptcy is court protection of debtors from creditors and debt collectors. While under bankruptcy, a judge stays all collection efforts-foreclosure, repossession of other assets, civil suits, garnishment of wages, and dunning-while the court determines which debts get discharged (forgiven), and which the borrower must repay from asset sales or future income.
That division depends on which chapter of the bankruptcy law the borrower files under and the bankruptcy exemptions in the filer's state. Under Chapter 13 (rescheduling), filers get to keep all their assets but commit to continue paying creditors for three to five years out of future income.
Under Chapter 7 (liquidation), filers keep all their future income but lose any home equity that is not exempt under their state's bankruptcy law (Table 2) . Any unsecured debts, including credit card and personal loans, that are not paid from the proceeds of liquidation gets discharged.
Importantly, the discharge of unsecured debt leaves more income for the mortgage. Our hypothesis follows directly from the first and second observations; if some households demanded Ch. 7 to avoid foreclosure, limiting access to Ch. 7 should increase foreclosures.
Our identification strategy follows from the third observation; limiting access to Ch. 7 should matter more in states with high home equity exemptions.
Before testing our hypothesis formally, we note some circumstantial evidence that supports it, or at least fails to contradict it.
Chart 2 shows that filing rates under either Chapter remain lower than one would predict given economic and housing market conditions, and that the ratio of filings (Ch. 7/Ch. 13) has fallen. In other words, BAR appears to have reduced overall bankruptcy demand and the relative demand for Ch. 7.
Chart 3 shows how BAR appears to have reversed the historical relationship between bankruptcy filings, on the one hand, and the relative performance of mortgages and credit loans, on the other. Relative performance is measured by the past due mortgages per total mortgages held divided by past due credit card loans per total loans held. Relative mortgage performance used to improve when filings increased, consistent with the argument that filers were better positioned to make the mortgage once their credit card and other unsecured debt was discharged, but not so since BAR. 11 Before BAR, the correlation between filings and relative performance was -0.80 (p < .01). After BAR, the correlation was 0.66 (p = 0.16).
12 11 Number of filings seems like the correct unit, but the chart looks very similar using filing rates. 12 Indeed, big credit card banks have enjoyed record profits since BAR (Simkovic 2008) , while mortgage lenders have suffered record losses. The former, namely Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Citigroup, have been buying banks, thrifts, and investment banks that lost money on mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. The
What remains to be shown is that this circumstantial evidence is not just coincidence.
The bankruptcy law changed all at once in every state, and other things, namely home price appreciation, changed at the same time. We need an identification strategy that tells us where the impact of BAR should be greatest.
II.2 BAR Binds More in High Exemption States
We show numerically and algebraically that BAR is more likely to bind, and thus increase foreclosures, in states with high home equity exemptions. Intuitively, home owners in low exemption states were less likely to demand Ch. 7, so limiting access is less likely to matter
there. This section can be skipped if that point is understood.
II.2.1 Numerical Example
Imagine an indebted homeowner whose budget deteriorates from one month to the next: 
II.2.2. Algebra
The decision tree of a cash-constrained homeowner has many branches. Given positive equity, refinancing or selling the home might solve his problems. If not, he might default.
Given default, does he await foreclosure, or does he file bankruptcy? Given bankruptcy, does he file Ch. 7 or Ch. 13?
13 All is not lost, however. The borrower could sell his house and use some of his $40,000 in home equity to pay his credit card debt. Or, he could borrow against his home equity and use the proceeds to pay credit card debt.
Fortunately, our point can be made by modeling just a single branch of the decision tree.
Starting with a mortgagor in default and contemplating bankruptcy, we show that BAR is more likely to bind, and thus trigger foreclosure, in states with higher home equity exemptions.
Imagine a home owner that owes secured and unsecured creditors S and U. S is a mortgage on a home with expected value V, so home equity = V -S E > 0. Home equity is the borrower's only asset. The debtor earns Y per month. The debtor consumes c per month, or at least prefers to, and spends p per month on priority payments (child support, etc.).
The home owner is cashflow constrained: he has enough income after preferred consumption and priority payments to pay secured creditors, but not enough to pay secured and unsecured creditors:
To relax the constraint he considers bankruptcy. Under Ch. 7 he keeps his future income but loses any non-exempt home equity to unsecured creditors. Given home equity exemption EX, Ch. 7 leaves him with total wealth of Y + min [E, EX] . Under Ch. 13 he keeps all of his equity but he promises to pay some amount to unsecured lenders each month for three to five years.
That leaves him with E +Y -U', where U'  U denotes the present value of payments to unsecured lenders required under his Ch. 13 payment plan. 14 He prefers Ch. 7 if the loss of nonexempt assets under Ch. 7 is less than the present value of payments to unsecured lenders under Ch. 13:
Given E, the loss of non-exempt assets is decreasing in EX, so for given U', demand for Ch. 7 is increasing (non-decreasing) in EX. The means test only binds in a meaningful way if it diverts someone from Ch. 7 to Ch. 13.
Given Means > $167, a borrower is bound if and only if
Given M > $167 and E > 0, the means test is more likely to bind the higher is EX. Said differently, for two home owners with the same means and home equity, the one in the high EX state is more likely to be constrained by the means test.
Constrained Ch. 7 filers are left with less cash flow to pay the mortgage and so are more likely to face foreclosure. 16 Because high exemption states will have a larger fraction of constrained filers, we predict:
1) the surge in subprime mortgage foreclosure rates since BAR will be higher in high exemption states, 2) any increase in unsecured consumer credit delinquency rates since BAR will be lower in higher exemption states.
3) any change in prime mortgage foreclosures since BAR will be invariant to state exemptions. Prime mortgagors are (by definition) unlikely to demand bankruptcy protection so the means test is unlikely to bind.
IV. Tests
We test those predictions by estimating difference-in-difference regressions: The regression estimates imply that the impact of BAR on subprime foreclosures is smaller, but of the same order, as the impact of slower house price appreciation. The coefficient on BAR•EX in column 2 indicates that for a state with average home equity exemption/median home price, the average subprime foreclosure rate over the seven quarters after BAR was 12.6 percent higher than the average subprime foreclosure rate over all states over the period before BAR (4.6 percent). That translates to just over 32,000 more subprime foreclosures nationwide per quarter due to BAR. By comparison, a standard deviation decrease in home price appreciation increases the foreclosure rate 13.7 percent relative to the average. Average annual house price appreciation over the seven quarters before BAR was 8% higher than over the seven quarters following BAR, implying 47,689 more subprime foreclosures outstanding per quarter since BAR.
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IV.3 Robustness Checks
The main results in Table 3 are robust to several alternative specifications. We briefly discuss these alternatives here (actual results are available upon request). Including four lags of home price appreciation and all other economic variables does not appreciably alter the significance of BAR•EX. We also obtain similar results when we control for the share of subprime mortgages that are secured and the share with adjustable rates (though those data are only available post 2004:1). For those regressions, we found that the share of subprime mortgages that were securitized was positively and significantly related to the subprime foreclosure rate, which is consistent with the evidence in Keys et al (2008) that securitization agency problem contributed to foreclosures. The size and significance of the BAR•EX coefficient did not change appreciably when we added those extra controls, however. Using exemption levels that are not scaled by the median home price does not materially change the results.
V. How BAR Lowered Auto Loan Delinquency and Interest Spreads.
As secured lenders, auto lenders (like mortgage lenders) prefer that over-indebted borrowers file Ch. 7, have their unsecured debts discharged, then re-affirm their auto loan (Whitford 2006) . Accordingly, the gain to unsecured lenders created by BAR might adversely affect auto lenders as it did mortgage lenders. However, a specific provision in BAR inserted at the behest of auto lenders might offset that. 22 Before BAR, borrowers could buy a new car on credit then immediately file Ch. 13 and have their obligation lowered (-crammed‖) to the car's current -blue book‖ value. Book values for new cars, once they leave the lot, can be 20 percent below sticker price so buying and filing might save several $thousand on a mid-line sedan and several times that for a luxury make. 23 BAR curbs that maneuver by requiring filers to own a car for 910 days before their loan can be crammed in bankruptcy.
The impact of limiting cram-down on the auto credit market depends on several factors.
If the buy-and-file maneuver was rarely practiced, limiting cram-down should hardly affect the market. We have nothing to say about how frequently new car loans got crammed in bankruptcy 21 A standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate increases the foreclosure rate about 13.4 percent. Unemployment rates decreased almost 70 bps on average since BAR, implying 20,059 fewer foreclosures per quarter. 22 Whitford (2006) thoroughly discusses auto loan cram-down and how BAR altered treatment of automobile lenders under bankruptcy. He notes that the provision to limit cram-down of auto loans under Ch. 13 came at the behest of a Senator from Michigan and the American Financial Services Association, a trade association -including many lenders specializing in auto finance.‖ (p. 35). 23 Using detailed personal bankruptcy filings in Delaware, Zhu (2008) finds that that about 8 percent of Ch. 13 filers owned at least one -luxury brand‖ automobile, about the same fraction as for non-filers.
except to note that it must have happened, else auto lenders would not have lobbied Congress for protection. While the benefit to car buyers from having a loan crammed hardly seems big enough to motivate solvent borrowers to file, it might tempt marginal borrowers already verging on bankruptcy to upgrade to the latest model before filing. Gropp et al. (1997) found that auto loan interest rates were higher for households in states with high home equity exemptions. To see whether BAR undoes that link, we regress auto loan delinquency rates and interest rate spreads at the state level on the same variables used above, except we omit home price appreciation as we would not expect (nor did) that variable to matter for the auto credit market. The spread equals the difference between the interest rate on a fiveyear auto loan and the five-year Treasury bill. The auto interest rates are from Bankrate.com (see appendix). Auto loan delinquency rates are from the Consumer Delinquency Bulletin published by the ABA. The ABA reports separate delinquency rates on loans made directly by a bank or other financial institution and on indirect loans made by the auto dealer.
The auto credit market results (Table 4 ) are more mixed than the housing market results.
They depend partly on whether we use scaled or unscaled exemptions (so we report both) and the type of loan (direct or indirect). Overall, auto loan delinquency rates tended downward after BAR in higher or unlimited exemption states, significantly so for direct loans. 24 Consistent with that result, auto loan interest spreads also declined after BAR in states with high or unlimited exemptions. The link between spreads and exemptions was more significant using unscaled exemptions, but the magnitudes were comparable regardless. The decline in the average auto loan spread was 15 basis points lower after BAR for unlimited exemption states, a 5.7 percent decline relative to the mean over all states (265 basis points). The regression results show clearly in Chart 5.
VI. Conclusion
We conclude that the bankruptcy abuse reform of 2005 (BAR) contributed to the destabilizing surge in subprime foreclosures by shifting risk from credit card and auto lenders to mortgage lenders. The means test under BAR gives credit card and other unsecured creditors a stronger claim on borrowers' cash flow, and that weakens secured lenders' (implicit) claim on that cash flow. Limiting cram-down on auto loans eliminates another maneuver over-indebted borrowers could use to free up income for their mortgage. By making it harder for borrowers to avoid paying credit card debt and auto loans, BAR made it harder to pay the mortgage, hence higher foreclosure rates.
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The impact of BAR can be expected to vary over the business cycle and over time. The means test uses income over the previous six months, so more filers will qualify for Ch. 7 if unemployment rates rise. Over time, the relative supply and demand for mortgage and consumer credit will adjust to take account of the new bankruptcy rules.
The welfare impact of BAR is beyond our ken. That calculus depends firstly on the tradeoff between the insurance that soft bankruptcy laws provide and the moral hazard (abuse) such insurance invites, and secondly on how successfully BAR curbs bankruptcy abuse. 26 On a more modest point, we know that high bankruptcy exemptions once made auto credit more expensive (Gropp et al. 1997) . Our results suggest that BAR made it cheaper.
risk. If so, one might have expected BAR to have improved delinquency risk more for indirect loans, contrary to our findings. We thank Bill Whitford for discussion on this point. 25 To give credit, analysts at Credit Suisse (2007) noticed that among bankrupt mortgagors they tracked, those filing before BAR were more likely to avoid foreclosure than those filing after. They concluded BAR affected subprime mortgagors -profoundly.‖ 26 Ashcraft et al. (2007) consider the welfare implications but conclude agnostically.
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